Memory for context is known to rely on episodic binding and strategic retrieval processes. It is unclear, however, whether memory for different contextual features taps the same cognitive and neural mechanisms. Here, the authors compare memory for a perceptual feature (i.e., the format in which an item had been presented) and for a semantic feature (i.e., the concept with which an item had been paired) in 13 patients with lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, including patients with and without confabulation, and 13 healthy controls. Participants studied picture-word pairs and received an old-new recognition test that included intact pairs, rearranged pairs, format pairs (studied pairs in which the picture-word format of each item was switched), old-new pairs, and new-new pairs. Hit rates for intact pairs were similar for all participant groups. Compared with controls, patients, especially those with confabulation, had higher false-alarm rates for format pairs but comparable false-alarm rates for rearranged pairs. The authors propose that distinct monitoring processes are engaged during retrieval of perceptual and semantic context, with only the former crucially dependent on ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
Suppose someone told you that Lillian had a date with Matthew yesterday, but asked you to keep it a secret. If you cannot resist gossiping about the date, you will at least need to remember its semantic context (i.e., the date was with Matthew, not with Michael) and its perceptual context (i.e., you did not witness the date but rather heard someone else talk about it). Misremembering either type of feature would lead to a distorted memory for the original event, although different failures would lead to qualitatively different memory errors. Associating the date with the wrong semantic context would alter the meaning of the episode (e.g., Lillian had a date with Michael), whereas associating the date with the wrong perceptual context would alter the perceptual experience of the episode (e.g., I saw Lillian on a date with Matthew). Are the cognitive processes and neural systems that allow us to remember semantic and perceptual features of past events the same, or do they differ?
Theoretical accounts of constructive memory-such as the source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hayes, D'Esposito, & Raye, 2000) , the constructive memory framework (Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998) , and the component process model (Moscovitch & Umiltà, 1991) -posit that accurate memory for the contextual features of an event relies on (a) a feature-binding process, required to encode the contextual features along with the central event and dependent on the medial temporal lobes, and (b) frontal-lobe-based self-initiated processes that facilitate binding at encoding and support monitoring operations at retrieval (see Simons & Spiers, 2003 , for a review). Functional neuroimaging (fMRI) and neuropsychological evidence support the notion that the prefrontal cortex is more strongly implicated in the processing of context information, compared with item information, for both semantic and perceptual context features. For example, dorsolateral prefrontal regions are more strongly activated during associative encoding (Achim & Lepage, 2005b; Murray & Ranganath, 2007) and retrieval (Achim & Lepage, 2005a; Lepage, Brodeur, & Bourgouin, 2003; Rugg, Henson, & Robb, 2003) , compared with encoding and retrieval of item information. Accordingly, patients with lesions in prefrontal cortex, although not amnesic in a traditional sense (Swick & Knight, 1996) , may be impaired at free recall (Dimitrov et al., 1999) , cued recall (Dimitrov et al., 1999; Swick & Knight, 1996) , and recognition (Dimitrov et al., 1999; Shimamura, Jurica, Mangels, Gershberg, & Knight, 1995) of pairs of stimuli, suggesting that they fail to remember the associations between semantic features.
There is also evidence that prefrontal cortex supports perceptual context memory. Memory for perceptual features (e.g., color or position) of studied items results in increased anterior, dorsolateral, medial, and ventrolateral prefrontal activations compared with item memory (e.g., Henson, Shallice, & Dolan, 1999; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & Greene, 2004; Nyberg et al., 1996; Ranganath, Johnson, & D'Esposito, 2000; Rugg, Fletcher, Chua, & Dolan, 1999) . Moreover, patients with prefrontal lesions exhibit deficits in remembering perceptual features of studied items (e.g., Ciaramelli & Ghetti, 2007; Davidson, Cook, Glisky, Verfaellie, & Rapcsak, 2005; Duarte, Ranganath, & Knight, 2005; Johnson, O'Connor, & Cantor, 1997 ; but see Thaiss & Petrides, 2003) .
Although the cognitive and neural dissociations between context and item memory have been extensively documented, the extent to which processes mediating memory for different types of contex-tual features can be dissociated from one another, at either the cognitive or the neural level, is unclear (but see Simons, Gilbert, Owen, Fletcher, & Burgess, 2005) . Perceptual and semantic processing involve distinct neuroanatomical pathways, which leads to the hypothesis that the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the encoding and evaluation of perceptual and semantic features may also differ (see Johnson et al., 2000) . In particular, remembering perceptual and semantic context may benefit from different retrieval-based monitoring operations.
Memories for experienced events are typically characterized by vivid perceptual details, leading individuals to monitor the perceptual quality of their memories when deciding whether they are accurate (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) . For example, participants may adopt a distinctiveness heuristic (e.g., Israel & Schacter, 1997; Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999) , a retrieval monitoring operation that leads individuals to reject candidate memories that lack the distinctive qualities expected for true memories (e.g., "I cannot remember what Lillian looked like on her date, so I probably did not witness the event personally"). Because studying pictures results in the formation of distinctive perceptual representations, the distinctiveness heuristic is particularly effective after pictorial encoding. For example, individuals are less susceptible to false recognition of lure words when the target words were studied along with corresponding pictures than they are in a standard word-only condition (see Schacter & Wiseman, 2006 , for a review). The distinctiveness heuristic is less likely to be effective when the critical context features are not perceptual but semantic in nature. Rejection of semantic context lures, however, would benefit from application of a recall-to-reject strategy (e.g., Gallo, 2004; Gallo, Bell, Beier, & Schacter, 2006) , which involves rejection of lures on the basis of the recall of logically inconsistent information (e.g., "Lillian probably did not go on a date with Michael since she is seeing Matthew these days").
The Current Study
Our main aim in this study was to investigate the cognitive and neural processes underlying memory for perceptual and semantic context features. We focused our investigation on patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage, a subgroup of whom exhibited confabulation. Confabulation is the production of false statements after cerebral disease (Schnider, 2008) . Confabulations can involve "fantastic" statements or beliefs (Damasio, Graff-Radford, Eslinger, Damasio, & Kassell, 1985) or bizarre combinations of fragments of true experiences (Dab, Claes, Morais, & Shallice, 1999; Kopelman, Ng, & Van der Broke, 1997) , general knowledge (Dalla Barba, 1993) , or internally generated content such as thoughts, dreams, and fantasies (Fotopoulou, Conway, & Solms, 2007; Johnson et al., 2000) . Confabulating patients have difficulty distinguishing true and false memories. Moscovitch and colleagues have shown that whereas both confabulating and nonconfabulating patients display a deficit in initiating a memory search, resulting in impaired recall of true events (Moscovitch & Melo, 1997) , only confabulating patients fail to reject false events in autobiographical recognition tasks (Fotopoulou et al., 2007; Gilboa, Alain, Stuss, Melo, Miller, & Moscovitch, 2006) . This suggests that ventromedial prefrontal cortex is crucially involved in postretrieval monitoring. It is not clear, however, whether this brain region is essential for monitoring any type of contextual information or whether it is preferentially involved in monitoring some types of information more than others. Answering this question would contribute new information regarding the nature of the monitoring deficit associated with confabulation.
We devised an experimental paradigm that yielded separate measures of memory for perceptual and semantic context features. Participants studied picture-word pairs (e.g., ࡖ-SUN, LEAF-☺, and ♫-CANDY), and received an old-new recognition test that included intact pairs (e.g., ࡖ-SUN), rearranged pairs (e.g., ࡖ-CANDY), and pairs in which the picture-word format of each item was switched from study to test (format pairs; e.g., HEART-). Test pairs composed of one studied and one unstudied item (e.g., ࡖ-BABY), as well as completely new pairs (e.g., DOG-OE), were also included for comparison purposes. False alarms to rearranged and format pairs were interpreted as failures in monitoring semantic and perceptual context, respectively. These measures are not process pure, as is the case for most empirical indexes (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002) , but they can reasonably be assumed to differ in their relative demands on the two types of context features. If patients show different levels of impairment for perceptual and semantic features, this would lend support to the hypothesis that memory for different context features reflects distinguishable cognitive processes and neural substrates. We were also interested in investigating whether confabulating patients showed more marked context memory deficits than nonconfabulating patients with similar brain pathology. Comparing patients with and without confabulation would inform understanding of the relative impact of ventromedial prefrontal damage and confabulation on context memory. by computerized axial tomography (CT) or MRI scans or medical files. Participants included 13 patients with brain damage and 13 healthy individuals. Patients were recruited at the Centro Studi e Ricerche di Neuroscienze Cognitive, Cesena, Italy. All patients had lesions limited to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In all cases, the lesion was the result of the rupture of an aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery, which was surgically repaired. Six patients exhibited confabulation. We henceforth refer to this group as VMPFCϩ patients. We initially classified patients as confabulators on the basis of clinical evidence and reports of their everyday behavior and obtained additional confirmation from scores on the Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993 ; see the next section for details) and on the continuous recognition task devised by Schnider (2008) . All VMPFCϩ patients produced momentary confabulations (Schnider, 2008) . For example, without any probe, Patient 4 told the experimenter that they had met at his daughter's wedding. VMPFCϩ patients also exhibited behaviorally spontaneous confabulations (Schnider, 2008) . That is, they may act according to their confabulations (e.g., Patient 3 often searched for his work uniform during the session). VMPFCϩ patients had a mean age of 54.5 years (range ϭ 45-65) and a mean of 10.5 years of education (range ϭ 5-13).
Method

Participants
The other 7 patients exhibited memory and executive impairment similar to that seen in the VMPFCϩ group (see results on neuropsychological measures, reported later) but no evidence of confabulation. We henceforth refer to this group as VMPFCϪ patients. The absence of confabulation was established in interviews with patients' relatives and further corroborated on the basis of patients' scores on the Confabulation Battery. VMPFCϪ patients had a mean age of 52.7 years (range ϭ 44 -70) and a mean of 10 years of education (range ϭ 5-18).
For 10 patients, the lesion analysis was based on CT scans. MRI scans were available for 2 patients. We were unable to obtain Patient 11's MR images and thus relied on the neuroanatomical descriptions provided in his medical files. We used Damasio and Damasio's (1989) template method to reconstruct each patient's lesion. Briefly, the location and extent of each lesion were traced manually from slices of CT or MRI scans onto axial templates on which Brodmann's areas (BA) were premarked. Figure 1 shows the extent of patients' brain lesions. The regions with the most extensive damage were the ventromedial prefrontal areas, in particular BAs 10, 12, 24, and 32.
The control group consisted of 13 individuals matched to the patients on mean age (53.5 years; range ϭ 44 -65) and mean years of education (10.4 years; range ϭ 5-18). As a result, all three participant groups were equated with respect to mean age and education. Participants were screened for clinically significant depression, alcohol and drug abuse, epilepsy, and any other known neurological conditions. All participants gave informed consent, and all study procedures were approved by the ethics committee of the University of Bologna. Table 2 shows mean scores on psychometric tests for both VMPFCϩ and VMPFCϪ patients. Both groups exhibited normal mean scores on the Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) , the Verbal Judgment Task (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) , and the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) . This suggests that patients' general cognitive functioning was generally preserved, although weak in a few individuals in each group. On the Wechsler Memory Scale (Wechsler, 1987) , both groups of patients obtained a mean General Memory Index that was 1 standard deviation below average performance. On the Buschke-Fuld Test (Buschke & Fuld, 1974) , a standardized selective-reminding list-learning task with a free recall test, both groups of patients showed highly pathological consistent long-term retrieval scores (number of words recalled until Figure 1 . Location of brain damage in ventromedial prefrontal cortex patients with (VMPFCϩ) and without (VMPFCϪ) confabulation, according to the standard template provided by Damasio and Damasio (1989) . the last trial without reminding), with mean performance levels below the fifth percentile (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) . Patients also completed a prose passage recall task (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) in which they listened to a short story and were asked to immediately recall as many details as possible. Following the recall task, patients heard the passage for a second time and, after a 10-min delay, were asked to recall the passage again. Both groups of patients showed below-average performance on immediate and delayed recall. In contrast, short-term memory was preserved in both patient groups. The Tower of London Test (Culbertson & Zillmer, 2001 ) provided a measure of executive functioning. Total moves scores (i.e., the number of moves executed by the participant minus the minimum number of moves) were elevated, relative to normal levels, for both patient groups. The two groups also performed relatively poorly on the Letter Fluency Task (Lezak, 1995) and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987) , although scores fell within the normal range.
Neuropsychological Evaluation
For a systematic assessment of patients' confabulations, we administered the Confabulation Battery by Dalla Barba (1993) to both confabulating and nonconfabulating patients, with the exception of 2 nonconfabulating patients, Patients 7 and 13, who were no longer available for testing. The Confabulation Battery includes six subsections of questions probing personal semantic memory, personal episodic memory, orientation in time and space, general semantic memory, "I don't know" semantic memory, and "I don't know" episodic memory. The "I don't know" semantic and episodic memory sections contain questions for which "I don't know" is an appropriate response (e.g., "Do you remember what you were doing on April 5, 1975?"). To corroborate patients' memory statements, we conducted interviews with their relatives and applied Dalla Barba's criteria (1993) for classifying answers as confabulations. VMPFCϩ and VMPFCϪ patients achieved a similar percentage of correct responses in all sections (personal semantic memory, 89% vs. 90%; personal episodic memory, 34% vs. 46%; orientation in time and space, 58% vs. 65%; general semantic memory, 50% vs. 44%; "I don't know" semantic memory, 76% vs. 92%; and "I don't know" episodic memory, 94% vs. 98%; ps Ͼ .3). However, compared with VMPFCϪ patients, VMPFCϩ patients produced a higher number of confabulations in the personal episodic (50% vs., 16%, p Ͻ .05), orientation in time and space (33% vs. 13%, p Ͻ .05), and general semantic (25% vs. 12%, p Ͻ .05) memory sections.
We also include the scores patients obtained in the continuous recognition task developed by Schnider and Ptak (1999) . This test consists of two runs of a continuous recognition task. Critically, some of the targets appearing on the first run reappeared as distractors in the second run. A temporal context confusion index is then calculated as [(FalseAlarms Run2 /Hits Run2 ) Ϫ (FalseAlarms Run1 /Hits Run1 )], which reflects patients' tendency to endorse, in the second run, items that were targets in the first run (Schnider & Ptak, 1999) . According to Schnider (2008) , such an inability to filter out information irrelevant to the current reality is the hallmark of spontaneous confabulation. Temporal context confusion scores were also available for 6 of the 7 nonconfabulating patients. In line with Schnider's results, confabulating patients showed higher temporal context confusion scores compared with nonconfabulating patients (0.50 vs. 0.15), t(8) ϭ 4.56, p Ͻ .01 (see Table 2 ).
Materials
We selected 65 medium-frequency words (mean frequency ϭ 111.5 per 1.5 million occurrences, range ϭ 45-227; mean familiarity ϭ 6.6, range ϭ 5.6 -6.9; and mean concreteness ϭ 6.26, range ϭ 3.9 -6.9; see Barca, Burani, & Arduino, 2001) , between four and eight letters long, and 65 medium-familiarity pictures (mean familiarity ϭ 2.99, range ϭ 1-4.75; mean name agreement ϭ 3.72, range ϭ 2.2-4.65; and mean image agreement ϭ 3.43, range ϭ 1.5-4.85; see Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) . The picture and the word sets were nonoverlapping (i.e., the label of a picture would not be found in the word set). Twenty-five picture-word pairs and 25 word-picture pairs, consisting of random combinations of 50 words and 50 pictures, were presented at study. For word-picture pairs, the word was presented in black uppercase Arial font on the left side of the screen, and the picture was shown on the right side of the screen. For picture-word pairs, the word was presented on the right side of the screen, and the picture was shown on the left side of the screen. The remaining 10 words and 10 pictures were not studied but were included as lures in the recognition test. During the recognition test, 60 item pairs were presented, including (a) 20 previously studied intact pairs; (b) 10 rearranged pairs, consisting of studied items randomly rearranged to form new pairings; (c) 10 format pairs, created by replacing the words from 10 studied pairs with unstudied pictures that showed the object named by each word and by replacing the pictures from the same pairs with unstudied words that named the object shown in the pictures; (d) 10 old-new pairs, created by combining 5 words and 5 pictures from 10 different studied pairs with 5 unstudied pictures and 5 unstudied words, respectively; and (e) 10 new-new pairs, composed entirely of unstudied stimuli. Table 3 summarizes the stimulus types.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. Item pairs were presented visually at a rate of one pair every 5 s, with an interstimulus interval of 1 s. During the study phase, participants were asked to memorize the item pairs for a subsequent memory test. They were explicitly instructed to memorize the pairs, not just the individual items, and the format (word vs. picture) in which each item appeared. A recognition test immediately followed the study session. Participants were requested to indicate, for each pair, whether it was identical to one they had seen at study. It was emphasized that for a pair to be called old, (a) the word and the picture must have been paired at study and (b) the word and the picture must have retained the same format as at study. To ensure that participants understood the instructions, they were asked to repeat them to the experimenter. There was no time limit for responding. Table 4 presents hit rates, overall false alarm rates, and a measure of recognition accuracy obtained by subtracting overall false alarm rates from hit rates (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) . 
Results
Overall Recognition
A one-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) on recognition accuracy yielded a significant effect of group, F(2, 23) ϭ 6.99, p Ͻ .005. Post hoc comparisons using Scheffé tests indicated that recognition accuracy was lower for the VMPFCϩ group than for controls ( p Ͻ 0.05), but did not differ significantly from that of VMPFCϪ patients ( p ϭ .27). These results indicated a drop in overall old-new recognition in patients compared with normal controls.
Hit Rates and False Alarm Rates
A mixed ANOVA on endorsement rates, with group as a between-subjects factor and item type (targets vs. lures) as a withinsubject factor yielded a significant effect of group, F(2, 23) ϭ 7.88, p Ͻ .005, and a significant effect of item type, F(2, 23) ϭ 1349, p Ͻ .001. The main effects were qualified by a significant Group ϫ Item Type interaction, F(2, 23) ϭ 6.99, p Ͻ .005. To probe this interaction, we conducted separate ANOVAs on hit rates and false alarm rates. The ANOVA on hit rates, which were high across groups, showed no significant effect of group (F Ͻ 1.0, p ϭ .83). The ANOVA on false alarm rates, with group and lure type (rearranged vs. format vs. Half of the old-new lures involved a studied word paired with a new picture (old-newP lures), whereas the other half involved a studied picture paired with a new word (old-newW lures). To investigate whether the VMPFCϩ group was more susceptible to false recognition for one of these subclasses of old-new lures, we performed additional separate ANOVAs on false alarm rates for oldnewW and old-newP lures, respectively. False alarm rates for oldnewP lures showed a significant effect of group, F(2, 23) ϭ 6.81, p Ͻ .005, reflecting the fact that VMPFCϩ patients committed more false alarms than did VMPFCϪ patients (.025 vs. .007, p Ͻ .05) and normal controls (.025 vs. .004, p Ͻ .05). In contrast, we found no significant group differences for false alarm rates to old-newW lures, F(2, 23) ϭ 1.67, p ϭ .20. Thus, the effect of group on the false alarm rate to old-new lures was driven by group differences in rejecting lures that paired an old word with a new picture.
Discussion
In this study, we investigated memory for semantic and perceptual context features in patients with damage in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, including a subgroup of confabulating patients. This population is expected to exhibit a severe susceptibility to false recognition (see Ciaramelli, Ghetti, Frattarelli, & Làdavas, 2006; Gilboa et al., 2006; Schnider & Ptak, 1999) . In the following sections, we discuss our evidence concerning the differential effect of ventromedial prefrontal damage on memory for semantic and perceptual context and concerning the relation between perceptual context memory deficits and confabulation.
Memory for Perceptual and Semantic Features After Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage
The main finding of this study was that patients with lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, whether presenting confabulation or not, exhibited impaired memory for perceptual context features, as reflected in increased false alarm rates to format lures but preserved memory for semantic context features. The increased susceptibility to false recognition of format lures following ventromedial prefrontal lesions is in line with previous studies that have demonstrated an involvement of this region in the retrieval of perceptual details of complex events (e.g., King, Hartley, Spiers, Maguire, & Burgess, 2005) . In contrast, patients were able to retrieve the correct association between two studied items, suggesting that memory for semantic context was unimpaired. Similar findings were reported by Dab et al. (1999) , who described a confabulating patient performing normally in a paired-associate learning task, despite impairments in various source monitoring tasks.
This result is intriguing because remembering the association between semantic features should, in principle, rely on strategic retrieval processes as much as remembering the association between perceptual features Yonelinas, 2002) . Indeed, prefrontal cortex damage has been found to be accompanied by associative memory deficits (e.g., Shimamura et al., 1995; Swick & Knight, 1996) . Most studies of associative recognition in prefrontal patients, however, have focused on patients with dorsolateral lesions (e.g., Shimamura et al., 1995; Swick & Knight, 1996) . As well, the neuroimaging literature has emphasized the contribution of dorsolateral rather than ventromedial prefrontal cortex to both encoding (see Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007) and retrieval of associations between items (e.g., Lepage et al., 2003) . Our finding that memory for semantic context can be preserved after damage in ventromedial prefrontal cortex suggests that this brain region may not be essential for remembering semantic associations between items.
How can the dissociation between perceptual and semantic context memory after ventromedial prefrontal damage be explained? One possibility, mentioned in the introduction, is that false alarms to format and rearranged lures result from failures of different retrieval monitoring processes. In particular, correct rejection of rearranged lures may have been supported by a recallto-reject strategy (e.g., Gallo, 2004; Rotello, Macmillan, & Van Tassel, 2000; Yonelinas, 2002) . For example, participants who studied the pair sofa-pipe may have correctly rejected the lure sofa-apple if they recalled thinking about a person smoking on a sofa, which clearly disqualifies the lure. In contrast, format lures did not violate the semantic gist of the studied pairs. If the concepts heart and sun were paired at study, the same concepts were also paired at test. The perceptual features of format lures (e.g., HEART-), however, differed markedly from those of the corresponding studied pairs (e.g., ࡖ-SUN). Thus, avoiding false recognition of format lures depends critically on processing of perceptual features.
Control participants may have relied on a distinctiveness heuristic to reject format lures (e.g., "If I had seen the word HEART as a picture, I would remember it"; Israel & Schacter, 1997; Schacter et al., 1999) . Self-initiation of the distinctiveness heuristic depends on the integrity of prefrontal cortex (see Hwang et al., 2007) ; therefore, patients in our study may have been unable to use this strategy. This interpretation is consistent with the finding that confabulating patients were impaired at rejecting format lures but able to reject rearranged lures. This dissociation did not merely reflect a tendency on the patients' part to endorse gist-consistent lures, as were the format lures. Indeed, confabulating patients also failed to reject old-new lures, which contained a novel element. Here, too, the deficit was specific for old-new lures in which the novel element was a picture, whereas patients were able to reject old-new lures in which the novel element was a word. Thus, patients appeared specifically impaired at rejecting relatively memorable stimuli (i.e., pictures) that healthy individuals easily reject using heuristics on the basis of expected memorability (Schacter et al., 1998 ; see also Ghetti, 2003) .
We note that self-initiation of a distinctiveness heuristic requires detecting a conflict between the saliency of a picture and the absence of the expected strong memory signal. Conflict detection has been shown to rely on ventromedial prefrontal regions, including the anterior cingulate cortex (Di Pellegrino, Ciaramelli, & Làdavas, 2007) , which are damaged in our patients. The patients' failure to use a distinctiveness heuristic may thus have resulted from a failure to detect the conflict between expected and actual qualities of the memory probes.
Using a distinctiveness heuristic also makes heavy demands on metacognitive processes. Individuals have to think about how they normally remember pictures and words to reject lures that do not convey the expected perceptual experience. There is evidence that lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex cause an impairment in metacognition (Schnyer, Verfaellie, Alexander, LaFleche, Nicholls, & Kaszniak, 2004) , which may have further disadvantaged patients (see also Ghetti, 2003) . Of course, rejecting rearranged lures is also believed to require self-initiated monitoring processes (Achim & Lepage, 2005a) , but these processes may differ from those operating in the service of the distinctiveness heuristic. Indeed, adoption of a distinctiveness heuristic has been shown to decrease activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Gallo, Kensinger, & Schacter, 2006 ; see also Budson, Droller, et al. 2005) , whereas rejection of rearranged lures results in increases in dorsolateral prefrontal activity (Achim & Lepage, 2005a) .
An alternative possibility that should be considered is that patients did not have distinctive information about studied pictures available at retrieval. For example, although participants were explicitly asked to attend to both the specific pairings and the specific format of the items at study, we cannot rule out that patients were selectively impaired at encoding visual information. However, we favor an interpretation based on retrieval processes rather than encoding processes for two reasons. First, fMRI studies have emphasized the contribution of ventromedial prefrontal cortex to retrieval operations King et al., 2005; Simons, Davis, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2006; Simons, Henson, Gilbert, & Fletcher, 2008) , whereas memory encoding mainly relies on ventrolateral regions (Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007) . For example, in a source memory study examining both retrieval-and encoding-related activity, correct compared with incorrect source memory decisions were characterized by stronger ventromedial prefrontal cortex (BA 10/32) activity at retrieval, but not at encoding (Cansino, Maquet, Dolan, & Rugg, 2002) . A recent meta-analysis contrasting brain activity associated with retrieval success and encoding success revealed that within PFC, retrieval-dominant sites were located more medially (BA 10) than encoding-dominant sites (Spaniol et al., 2009) . Moreover, confabulation is deemed an impairment of retrieval processes (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Moscovitch, 1989) , consistent with the fact that it also affects memories acquired before the occurrence of brain damage. Of course, our proposal is speculative at this point. Future experiments assessing perceptual priming for pictorial stimuli after ventromedial prefrontal damage might contribute to clarification of the origin of the observed dissociation between perceptual and semantic context memory.
Memory for Perceptual Features in Confabulation
Our results show impaired memory for perceptual context in confabulating patients compared with nonconfabulating patients. This finding is consistent with previous laboratory studies that have documented confabulators' impaired memory for several aspects of the context of events (e.g., Ciaramelli et al., 2006; Dab et al., 1999; Schnider, Bonvallat, Emond, & Leeman, 2005; Schnider & Ptak, 1999) , as well as their difficulties in distinguishing memories from other mental products (Fotopoulou et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2000) . For example, confabulating patients showed an increased tendency compared with nonconfabulating patients to false alarm to lures that were similar conceptually but different perceptually from studied items (Gilboa et al., 2006; Schnider et al., 2005) .
It should be noted, however, that although perceptual context memory deficits were sensitive to confabulation, they were not specific to confabulation. Even nonconfabulating patients showed impaired memory for perceptual context, compared with normal controls, although to a lesser extent than did confabulating pa-tients. Context memory deficits in nonconfabulating patient populations have previously been reported (e.g., Duarte, Ranganath, & Knight, 2005; Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; Schnider, Gutbrod, Hess, & Schroth, 1996) , and several studies have failed to detect differences in the source memory deficits of confabulating and nonconfabulating patients (Ciaramelli & Ghetti, 2007; Dab et al., 1999; Dalla Barba, Cappelletti, Signorini, & Denes, 1997; Johnson et al., 1997) . For this reason, it seems reasonable to conclude that context memory deficits following damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex represent one feature of confabulation rather than its cause (Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002; Schnider, 2008) .
In conclusion, patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage were impaired at remembering perceptual but not semantic features of their memories. This result suggests that memory for different aspects of context may rely on distinct neurocognitive mechanisms. Specifically, we propose that ventromedial prefrontal damage may prevent patients from applying a distinctiveness heuristic at retrieval, a deficit that disproportionately affects memory for highly memorable (perceptual) features. Confabulators' failure to apply heuristics based on expected memorability may explain the high incidence of false memories rich in vivid details (Johnson et al., 1997; Ciaramelli & Ghetti, 2007) and the false recognition of highly implausible autobiographical lures (Gilboa et al., 2006) , both of which characterize confabulation.
